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Abstract
A semi-quantum key distribution (SQKD) protocol allows two users, one of whom is
restricted in their quantum capabilities, to establish a shared secret key, secure against
an all-powerful adversary. In this paper, we design a new SQKD protocol using high-
dimensional quantum states and conduct an information theoretic security analysis.
We show that, similar to the fully-quantum key distribution case, high-dimensional
systems can increase the noise tolerance in the semi-quantum case. Along the way, we
prove several general security results which are applicable to other SQKD protocols
(both high-dimensional ones and standard qubit-based protocols).
1 Introduction
It is well known that secure key distribution, using only classical communication, is impos-
sible unless computational assumptions are placed on the power of the adversary. If both
A and B are able to communicate using quantum resources, however, perfect security is
possible and the only assumption on the adversary required is that she obey the laws of
quantum physics. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols allow two parties (Alice, A,
and Bob, B) to establish a shared secret key, secure against an all-powerful adversary (Eve,
E). Since the first QKD protocol developed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 (the so-called
BB84 protocol [1]), both the theory and practice of QKD has been increasing dramatically.
For a general survey of QKD, both the theory and practice, the reader is referred to [2, 3, 4].
Since perfect security for key distribution is impossible if both A and B are restricted to
classical communication while it is possible if both A andB are “quantum capable,” a natural
question to ask is “what is the middle ground?” A communication model designed to help
answer this question is the so-called semi-quantum model of cryptography, first introduced
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in 2007 by Boyer et al. [5]. In this model, one party is “fully quantum” in that they can
do anything the protocol requires of them so long as it is possible according to quantum
mechanics. The second party, however, is restricted to operations which are mathematically
equivalent to classical communication. Thus, one party is quantum while the other party
is “classical.” Since its original introduction in 2007, there have been numerous new semi-
quantum key distribution (SQKD) protocols developed [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. There have
also been extensions to the model beyond basic key distribution including secret sharing
[13, 14, 15] and state comparison [16, 17, 18].
(S)QKD protocols operate in two stages: first is a quantum communication stage whereby
users utilize the quantum channel, along with the classical authenticated channel (which is
a classical communication channel that is authenticated, but not secret), to establish a raw
key. A and B both have their own raw key which is a string of classical bits that are partially
correlated (there may be some errors due to an adversary’s attack or just natural noise) and
partially secret (an adversary may have some information on this raw key). Thus this raw-
key by itself cannot be used directly as a secret key. Users, therefore, must run a second stage
where, at a minimum, they will execute an error correction protocol using the authenticated
classical channel (leaking additional information to E) followed by a privacy amplification
protocol which takes the error-corrected raw key and hashes it down to a smaller secret key.
The relative size of the secret key compared to the initial raw-key (called the key-rate of the
protocol) is a statistic of great importance in QKD research and bounding it, as a function of
observed noise in the quantum channel, is the main challenge in any (S)QKD security proof.
A related statistic is the noise tolerance of the protocol which specifies the noise threshold
after which the adversary has too much information and so users must simply abort (e.g.,
BB84’s noise tolerance is 11% [19, 20]). Before this tolerance threshold is reached, privacy
amplification is able to give a positive, though potentially small, key (the size of the secret key
decreases as the noise increases due to the direct correlation between noise and adversarial
information gain).
As far as semi-quantum cryptography is concerned, there have been, by now, several
proofs of security based on key-rate computations for SQKD protocols and, rather surpris-
ingly, despite the limitations on one of the users, along with the increased attack strategy
space afforded to the adversary (due to the requirement of a two-way quantum channel al-
lowing quantum resources to travel from A, to B, then back to A), noise tolerances compare
favorably to several fully quantum protocols. In particular, in [21], the noise tolerance of the
original Boyer et al., protocol can approach 11%, the same as BB84. However, this optimistic
result required looking at numerous mismatched statistics (a technique introduced in [22],
extended for one-way channels in [23, 24, 25], and expanded for two-way quantum channels
in [21]). Without these statistics, and only looking at the error rate, the Boyer et al., protocol
has a noise tolerance of 6.14%, though this is only a lower-bound and future refinements to
the security proof techniques may improve this to the 11% found with mismatched measure-
ments. Currently, the best-known noise tolerance for an SQKD protocol is from [26] which
can attain a tolerance of 17.8% or even as high as 26% for certain, practical, quantum chan-
nels (a result comparable to BB84 with Classical Advantage Distillation [27, 28]). Again,
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this high tolerance bound required looking at numerous mismatched measurements.
Designing protocols with increased noise tolerance is an important task. Encouraged by
recent theoretical successes in fully-quantum QKD using high-dimensional carriers [29, 30,
31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39] and, in particular, these protocols’ ability to withstand high
channel noise levels (some reaching 50% as the dimension of the quantum carrier approaches
infinity), we ask, can a high dimensional quantum communication channel also benefit semi-
quantum key distribution? Or does this substantial improvement in noise tolerance require
two fully quantum users to truly harness? We note that a high-dimensional SQKD protocol
was introduced in [33], using a quantum walk as the information carrier, however a noise
tolerance computation was not performed due to the great complexity of that protocol and
so this question still remained open (though the methods we develop in this paper may be
applicable to other protocols such as this quantum-walk based protocol).
In this paper, we show high dimensional states can benefit semi-quantum communi-
cation and in doing so, make several contributions in this work. We design a new high-
dimensional SQKD protocol and conduct an information theoretic security analysis allowing
us to compute a lower-bound on its key-rate based on observed channel noise. Our security
proof introduces several new techniques which may be applicable to other (S)QKD pro-
tocols (both standard qubit-based and future-developed high-dimensional ones including,
perhaps, the quantum-walk SQKD protocol developed in [33]). Semi-quantum protocols
rely on a two-way quantum channel giving the adversary a greater attack strategy space
making security analyses for semi-quantum protocols difficult, especially in higher dimen-
sions (all past work involving key-rate computations have been for the qubit case). As such,
our new methods may prove beneficial not only for other semi-quantum protocols, but also
fully-quantum protocols reliant on a two way quantum channel (of which there are several
[40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45]). Finally, we evaluate our protocol’s performance and determine its
noise tolerance for varying dimensions and show that, indeed, high dimensional carriers do
benefit the noise tolerance of semi-quantum protocols. We show that our protocol’s noise
tolerance tends to 30% as the dimension increases; this result is without requiring any mis-
matched statistics. While this is not as high as the 50% achieved in the fully quantum case,
this is still higher than any other SQKD protocol to-date and, considering that this is a
semi-quantum protocol, where one participant is severely limited in their capabilities, is still
a very positive result. This work paves the way for future research in higher-dimensional
systems for semi-quantum or two-way quantum cryptography. By analyzing semi-quantum
protocols with high dimensional systems, we further map out the “gap” between classical
and quantum communication systems.
In this work, we are primarily concerned with a theoretical protocol and not practical
attacks or complications involving its implementation. We note that several fully quan-
tum high-dimensional QKD protocols have been experimentally implemented and the ex-
perimental generation of high dimensional entangled states has seen rapid progress lately
[46, 47, 48, 49]. However, we do not concern ourselves with practical implementations of
this system. Instead, we are solely interested in understanding how high-dimensional quan-
tum states may benefit the semi-quantum model of cryptography, leaving practical issues as
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future work.
2 Preliminaries
If ρAB is a density operator (i.e., a Hermitian positive semi-definite operator of unit trace)
acting on Hilbert space HA ⊗ HB, then we write ρA to mean the partial trace over the B
portion, namely ρA = trBρAB. Similarly for other, or multiple, systems. Given a system
ρAB which is unmeasured, and an orthonormal basis V = {|v1〉 , · · · , |vd〉} for the A system
(which is of dimension d), then we write ρAV B to mean the density operator resulting from
a measurement of the A register in this V basis.
We use H(A)ρ to mean the entropy function - either the classical Shannon entropy (if ρ
is a classical state) or the quantum von Neumann entropy (the context will always be clear
which we mean). Note this implies ρ is a density operator acting on at least some A register
(if it acts on others, we first trace out those additional spaces and compute the entropy
in the resulting A space only). The von Neumann entropy is defined: H(A)ρ = H(ρA) =
−tr(ρA log ρA) (where all logarithms in this paper are base two). The conditional entropy is
denoted H(A|B)ρ and defined H(AB)ρ − H(A)ρ. If ρAB is an unmeasured quantum state,
then by H(AV |B)ρ we mean the conditional entropy in the operator resulting from measuring
the A portion of ρAB in the V basis (the B portion remains unmeasured). By H(A
V |BV )ρ
we mean the same, but after also measuring the B portion (in which case the entire state is
classical and so Shannon entropy is used). If the context is clear, we may drop the subscript.
Finally, for a real number x ∈ [0, 1] we write H(x) to mean the binary Shannon entropy,
namely H(x) = −x log x− (1− x) log(1− x).
Given operator X, we write ||X|| to mean the trace distance. If X is Hermitian and finite
dimensional, then this is simply the sum of the absolute values of the eigenvalues of X.
Finally, let ρABE be a quantum state where the A portion is d-dimensional and let
V = {|v1〉 , · · · , |vd〉} and U = {|u1〉 , · · · , |ud〉} be two orthonormal bases. An important
entropic uncertainty relation which will be used later, was proven in [50] and states that for
any quantum state ρABE, it holds that:
H(AV |E)ρ +H(AU |B) ≥ − log c, (1)
where c = maxi,j | 〈vi|uj〉 |2. This will be used in our proof of security later.
2.1 Semi-Quantum Cryptography
The semi-quantum model, as introduced in [5], consists of at least one “fully-quantum” user
(typically A) and one “classical” or “semi-quantum” user (typically B). This classical user
is only allowed to interact with the quantum channel in a very restricted way. In particular,
he can choose to do one of two things on receiving any quantum state from A:
• Reflect: If he chooses this option, he will disconnect from the quantum channel,
creating a loop back to A. In this case, the quantum user is simply “talking to herself”
over a large, looped, quantum channel.
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• Measure and Resend: If he chooses this option, he will perform a measurement of the
quantum state in a single, publicly known, basis (typically the computational basis).
Based on his measurement result, he will then send a new quantum state, prepared in
this same basis, back to A.
Clearly, if both users are semi-quantum and can only perform these two operations, the
system is mathematically equivalent to a classical communication protocol as both users
would be restricted to only operating directly in a single, publicly known, basis. Thus,
the interest in semi-quantum cryptography is to see how security holds when one user is
quantum, but the other is classical according to the above functionality.
Note that we are not considering practical device security in this work and are only
interested in the theoretical properties of semi-quantum communication. Thus we do not
concern ourselves with such attacks as the photon tagging attack [51, 52] or multi-photon
attacks (especially problematic when B chooses Measure and Resend as he must re-prepare
qubits in the observed state). Though interesting, these are outside the scope of this work -
techniques from [7] may prove beneficial to securing our protocol against these attacks but
we leave this as interesting future work.
As mentioned earlier, (S)QKD protocols operate, first, through a quantum communica-
tion stage. This stage utilizes the quantum communication channel and the authenticated
classical channel to output a raw-key of size N bits. From this error correction and privacy
amplification are run outputting a secret key of size `(N) bits. The key-rate is defined to
be the ratio `(N)/N . We are interested in the theoretical asymptotic limit. In this case,
assuming collective attacks (i.i.d. attacks where E is free to store a quantum memory system
for measurement at any future point in time [2]), it was shown in [20, 53] that:
r = lim
N→∞
`(N)
N
= inf(H(A|E)ρ −H(A|B)ρ), (2)
where ρABE is a density operator describing a single iteration of the quantum communication
stage, conditioned on that iteration being used to distill raw key material (i.e., not on
an iteration used only for error checking or an iteration that is later discarded due to an
incompatible basis choice). The infimum is over all collective attacks that induce the observed
noise statistics. Above, the A and B registers are the actual classical raw-key bit registers
and only the E portion is quantum. It is this entropy equation, and in particular the von
Neumann entropy H(A|E), that we are interested in computing and is the main challenge
(computing H(A|B) is generally trivial given the observed noise statistics).
Our protocol uses higher-dimensional systems and, as such, we must define the bases
we work with. For the classical user, we will use the computational basis of dimension 2n,
namely: {|0 · · · 00〉 , |0 · · · 01〉 , · · · , |1 · · · 11〉} which, when needed to simplify notation, we
will also label equivalently as {|0〉 , |1〉 , · · · , |2n − 1〉}. We use Z to denote this basis.
The quantum user, of course, is not restricted to operating in only one basis and so we
also define the following “F” basis:
F = {|F0〉 , |F1〉 , · · · , |F2n−1〉}, (3)
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where |Fx〉 = F |x〉 and F is the quantum Fourier transform, namely:
F |x〉 = 1√
2n
2n−1∑
y=0
exp(−piixy/2n−1) |y〉 . (4)
Of course, one may consider other bases that the quantum user may utilize. However,
our protocol will make use of both the Z and F bases. Note that, for the classical user,
if he chooses Measure and Resend or Reflect, that operation is performed on an entire
n-qubit signal state (e.g., he cannot reflect “half” the qubits and measure the other half in
our model).
3 The Protocol
Our protocol is shown in Protocol 1. The protocol operates by having A send signals of
n-qubits each. For each iteration, B will either Measure and Resend the entire n-qubit
state or he will Reflect the entire state. Whenever A sends a Z basis state and B chooses
to Measure and Resend, they will add n bits to their raw key. Once a sufficiently large raw
key has been established, standard error correction and privacy amplification are run. In the
next section we will compute a lower-bound on the key-rate of this protocol. We will consider
a noisy, but loss-less, quantum channel and ideal devices. Practical security concerns, though
interesting, are outside the scope of this work and would provide interesting future work.
Any collective attack against this protocol consists of two unitary operators (UF , UR) where
UF is applied in the forward channel and UR is applied in the reverse.
4 Security Analysis
We now analyze the security of our protocol. As with other (S)QKD protocols, we show
security against collective attacks. We will comment on general attacks later. Our security
analysis extends ideas introduced in our conference paper [54] but to the higher-dimensional
case and consists of two main parts: First, we will prove that it is sufficient to analyze a
particular one-way fully quantum protocol and, once security is proven there assuming the
same channel observations are made, security of our SQKD protocol follows immediately.
This reduction is very general and can apply to other SQKD protocols. Thus, to analyze
security of the two-way semi-quantum protocol, it suffices to consider a particular one-way
protocol which is easier to analyze as E only attacks once. Second, we analyze the security
of this one-way protocol through the use of entropic uncertainty relations, and continuity
of conditional von Neumann entropy. The techniques we develop in both steps are often
general and may be applicable to other two-way (S)QKD protocols.
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Protocol 1 n-dimensional SQKD: ΠSQKD
Public Parameters: n: the number of qubits to send per signal; pM , the probability of
choosing Measure and Resend; pZ , the probability of A choosing the Z basis.
Quantum Communication Stage: The quantum communication stage of the protocol
will repeat the following until a sufficiently large raw-key has been distilled:
1. With probability pZ , A prepares a randomly chosen Z basis state; otherwise she pre-
pares a randomly chosen F basis state. She records her choice of basis and the choice
of state and sends the resulting n-qubit state to B.
2. B chooses, with probability pM to Measure and Resend, measuring all n qubits in the
computational basis and recording the result and then resending the observed state
back to A. Otherwise, with probability 1 − pM , he chooses Reflect in which case he
reflects all n qubits back to A.
3. A measures the returning n qubit system in the same basis she used to prepare.
4. A and B, using the authenticated classical channel, divulge their choices (B his choice
of “Measure and Resend” or “Reflect” and A her choice of basis). If A chose the
Z basis and B chose Measure and Resend, they will use this iteration to contribute
towards their raw key; namely, B will append his n-bit measurement result string
and A will append her initial state she prepared to their respective raw-keys (in this
case, A’s subsequent measurement result is not used). We call this a key-distillation
iteration. Otherwise, this iteration (along with a suitably chosen random subset of
key-distillation iterations) may be used for error detection in the obvious way.
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4.1 Reduction to a One-Way Protocol
In this section we show how certain SQKD protocols, of arbitrary dimensions, may be re-
duced to a one-way protocol. Note that in [42], a method of reducing two-way fully quantum
protocols to one-way, entanglement based protocols was shown, however that method only
applies if the original protocol admits a certain symmetry property which semi-quantum
protocols necessarily lack (due to B’s use of Measure and Resend). As a first step, we first
consider an intermediate, two-way, SQKD protocol, which we denote by Πent. This inter-
mediate protocol is no longer prepare-and-measure, but instead has A preparing entangled
qudits and B performing a CNOT gate whenever he chooses Measure and Resend. The
protocol is shown in Protocol 2. It is not difficult to see that security of Πent implies se-
curity of ΠSQKD (i.e., Πent ⇒ ΠSQKD where “⇒” means “implies security of”). Indeed, A’s
prepare-and-measure scheme in ΠSQKD is equivalent to her preparing the entangled state of
2n qubits |ψ0〉 = 12n/2
∑
a |a, a〉 and sending the right register (consisting of n qubits) to B
while keeping the left-half to herself. If B chooses to reflect, this is nothing more than an
identity operation whereas if he chooses to Measure and Resend, then by applying CNOT
gates targeting his register and then measuring at some future time, this is equivalent to him
measuring immediately. Finally, when qubits return to A, she may measure both n qubit
registers in the same basis - standard arguments [2, 6] show that her measurement of the
A1 register is equivalent to her initially preparing the state she observes at this later point.
Furthermore, a collective attack against this protocol is identical to the ΠSQKD case, namely
two unitary attack operators (UF , UR).
Next, we introduce our one-way protocol, shown in Protocol 3 and denoted ΠOW. At
first glance, the two protocols, Πent (which is semi-quantum and uses a two-way quantum
channel) and ΠOW (which is one-way and fully quantum) do not appear similar. However, we
will prove that security of ΠOW implies security of Πent (which, in turn, implies security of
our actual protocol ΠSQKD). We do this by showing that, for any attack against Πent, there
exists an attack against ΠOW which causes E to gain as much information on the raw-key as
in Πent and, furthermore, the view according to A, B, and E are identical in both cases (i.e.,
the two cases are indistinguishable). Thus, if we analyze ΠOW (which is easier to do since it
is one-way), we automatically cover any attack against Πent. Ultimately, this technique is
an extension of a result in our conference paper [54] to the arbitrary, N -dimensional case
(only the qubit, N = 2 case was considered before). However, beyond being more general,
our proof here is also more refined as it does not require an additional “simplification” step
that was necessary in [54].
Let N = 2n. An attack against ΠOW consists of a probability distribution {p(b)} for all
b = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1 along with a single attack operator U acting on 2n qubits and E’s
quantum ancilla. Note that E gets to choose the values p(b) which B uses to prepare his
states - thus, E has partial control over B’s source device in ΠOW; the reason for this necessity
will be apparent later in our proof. We now prove it is sufficient to consider security of ΠOW
(in which case we have ΠOW ⇒ Πent ⇒ ΠSQKD).
Theorem 1. Let (UF , UR) be a collective attack against Π
ent and let ρABE be the resulting
density operator describing a single iteration of Πent in the event this attack is used. Then,
8
Protocol 2 Entanglement-Based n-dimensional SQKD: Πent
Public Parameters: n: the number of qubits to send per signal; pM , the probability of
choosing Measure and Resend; pZ , the probability of A measuring in the Z basis.
Quantum Communication Stage: The quantum communication stage of the protocol
will repeat the following until a sufficiently large raw-key has been distilled:
1. A prepares the 2n-qubit state: |ψ0〉 = 1√2n
∑2n−1
a=0 |a, a〉A1T and sends the “T” portion
to B.
2. B chooses, with probability pM to Measure and Resend in which case he applies the
operator CNOT⊗n, acting on the T space and his own private B register (also of n
qubits). Otherwise, with probability 1 − pM , he chooses Reflect and applies I⊗n to
the T portion (thus, his B register will remain independent of the system in this case).
Either way, the T register is then returned to A. Once returned, we rename the T
register as the A2 register.
3. A chooses to measure in the Z basis (with probability pZ) or the F basis (with prob-
ability 1 − pZ). She measures both the A1 register and the returned T register (now
called the A2 register) in the same basis (either both Z or both F). At this point, B
will measure his register in the Z basis if he chose Measure and Resend.
4. A and B divulge their choices (B his choice of “Measure and Resend” or “Reflect”
and A her choice of basis). If A choose the Z basis and B chose Measure and Resend,
they will save their measurement results and append the resulting value (as a bit-string)
to their respective raw-keys (A will use her result from the A1 register, discarding the
A2 register in this case).
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Protocol 3 One-Way n-dimensional QKD: ΠOW
Public Parameters: n: the number of qubits to send per signal; pM , the probability of
choosing Measure and Resend; pZ , the probability ofAmeasuring in the Z basis; {p(b)}2n−1b=0 ,
probability values set by the adversary but known to all parties.
Quantum Communication Stage: The quantum communication stage of the protocol
will repeat the following until a sufficiently large raw-key has been distilled:
1. B chooses, with probability pM operation “Measure and Resend” otherwise he chooses
“Reflect.” Note that the terminology Measure and Resend and Reflect do not have
any operational meaning in this protocol - we simply use them so that the reduction
later from our SQKD protocol ΠSQKD makes sense. If he chooses Reflect, he prepares
a 3n qubit state of the form:
|φR〉 =
2n−1∑
b=0
√
p(b) |b, b〉A1A2 ⊗ |0〉B (5)
where the right-most B register contains n qubits in the state |0〉. Otherwise, if he
chooses Measure and Resend, he prepares a 3n qubit state of the form:
|φMR〉 =
2n−1∑
b=0
√
p(b) |b, b, b〉A1A2B (6)
Regardless of his choice, he sends the A1A2 register (consisting of 2n qubits) to A.
2. Same as step (3) of Πent.
3. Same as step (4) of Πent.
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there exists an attack of the form ({p(b)}2n−1b=0 , U) against ΠOW such that, if σABE is the
resulting density operator of a single iteration of ΠOW in this case, it holds that σABE = ρABE.
In particular, there is no advantage to E in either case and, furthermore, no party A, B, or
E can distinguish between the two scenarios.
Proof. Fix an attack (UF , UR). Without loss of generality, we may write UF ’s action on basis
states as:
UF |a〉 ⊗ |χ〉E =
N−1∑
b=0
|b, ea,b〉 ,
where N = 2n and |ea,b〉 are arbitrary states in E’s ancilla (we assume, without loss of
generality in the collective attack case, that E’s ancilla starts in some pure state |χ〉E).
Unitarity, of course, imposes some restrictions on these states. In particular, for every a it
holds that:
N−1∑
b=0
〈ea,b|ea,b〉 = 1. (7)
Given this attack, we construct ({p(b)}, U), an attack against ΠOW, that satisfies the
theorem statement. To do so, we follow a technique first introduced in our conference paper
[54] but generalized here for higher dimensions. First, we set the values p(b) to:
p(b) =
1
N
N−1∑
a=0
〈ea,b|ea,b〉 (8)
Clearly p(b) ≥ 0 for all b. Furthermore, from Equation 7, it follows that:∑
b
p(b) =
1
N
∑
b
∑
a
〈ea,b|ea,b〉 = 1
N
∑
a
∑
b
〈ea,b|ea,b〉 = 1,
thus this is a valid probability distribution, and so a valid attack setting.
Now, consider the following operator Rw which we call the “rewind” operator as, in a way,
it “rewinds” the channel so that a state prepared by B in the one-way case (i.e., protocol
ΠOW) appears to all three parties as if it had been prepared by A in the two-way case (i.e.,
Πent). In particular, it will “setup” the A1 register and E’s quantum memory as if this had
been performed in the two-way Πent case. The only thing that cannot be “rewound” is B’s
measurement distribution, thus the need for E to set this separately through the p(b) values.
This operator acts on basis states |b, b〉 (sent by B in the one-way protocol ΠOW) as follows:
Rw |b, b〉A1A2 =
∑N−1
a=0 |a, b, ea,b〉√
N · p(b) . (9)
It is not difficult to see that Rw is an isometry. Indeed, given |b, b〉 and |b′, b′〉 for b 6= b′, we
have:
0 = 〈b, b|b′, b′〉 = 1
N
√
p(b)p(b′)
∑
a,a′
〈a, b, ea,b|a′, b′, ea′,b′〉 = 0.
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Figure 1: Showing the reduction from the semi-quantum protocol (ΠSQKD and Πent, top)
to the fully-quantum one-way protocol (ΠOW bottom). For the SQKD protocol, A prepares
qubits at time (1), Eve attacks, and then B performs an operation Measure and Resend or
Reflect. Time t∗ is after B’s operation. On the other hand, for the fully-quantum protocol,
B prepares two qubits and sends both to A. E attacks with a specially designed Rw operator
resulting in a state at time t∗. We claim a suitable Rw operator can be constructed so that
the density operators in both cases at time t∗ are identical. Later, when proving general
security of the one-way protocol, we do not require any special attack; clearly security of the
SQKD protocol, then, would follow. QM stands for E’s quantum memory.
Furthermore, we have:
1 = 〈b, b|b, b〉 = 1
N · p(b)
∑
a,a′
〈a, b, ea,b|a′, b, ea′,b〉
=
1
N · p(b)
∑
a
〈ea,b|ea,b〉 = 1.
Thus, Rw is an isometry and may be extended, using standard techniques, to a unitary
operator implying it is an operation that E may do within the laws of quantum physics. We
claim that U = (IA1⊗UR)Rw is the desired attack operator satisfying the theorem statement.
Refer to Figure 1. Consider the case when B chooses Measure and Resend. At time t∗
(after E attacks with UF and B’s Measure and Resend operation, but before E attacks a
second time with UR), the joint state held by A, B, and E using protocol Π
ent is found to
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be:
|ψentMR〉 =
1√
N
∑
a
|a〉A
∑
b
|b, ea,b, b〉TEB . (10)
Now, again, referring to Figure 1, consider the same case (namely, B choosing Measure and Resend)
but with the ΠOW protocol. In this event, B prepares the state
∑
b
√
p(b) |b, b, b〉A1A2B and E
attacks with Rw. The joint system then, at time t∗ is:
|φMR〉 =
∑
b
√
p(b)
(∑
a |a, b, ea,b〉√
N · p(b)
)
⊗ |b〉B =
1√
N
∑
a
|a〉A1
∑
b
|b, ea,b, b〉A2EB = |ψentMR〉
(11)
Thus, after applying Rw, the state of the joint system for the case of ΠOW is identical to that
of Πent. Of course, after applying UR (which happens in both scenarios since we constructed
U = (IA1 ⊗ UR)Rw), the systems will remain the same. Thus, any measurement outcomes
or entropy computations will be identical in both scenarios. It is trivial to show the same
holds true in the Reflect case for both protocols (in that case, the additional |b〉 term is
no longer there but the algebra remains the same otherwise). Thus, if one were to write
out a density operator description of both protocols, tracing their evolution, they would be
identical as the underlying systems are identical in all cases. Note that the only thing E
could not “rewind” with Rw is the probability distribution of B’s measurements (since he is
now preparing). Thus it is required that E gets to choose the distribution p(b) so that the
probability distribution in ΠOW matches that observed in Πent. This completes the proof.
Theorem 1 implies that it is sufficient to prove security of the one-way protocol ΠOW.
Since any attack against Πent can also be transformed into an attack against ΠOW, if we
analyze a general attack against the latter, this automatically gives security against the
former. Indeed, there may be more attack strategies for E against ΠOW as E has access to
both n qubit registers simultaneously; despite this, it is easier to analyze as it is a one-way
protocol. Furthermore, note that no party can distinguish between the two scenarios and, as
a consequence, observed channel noise in the “real” SQKD protocol Πent translate directly to
observed statistics in the one-way protocol ΠOW. Our goal is to prove security of Πent (which
proves security of ΠSQKD) and, given observed noise statistics there, if we prove security of ΠOW
given those same statistics, the key-rate can only be better in Πent (since ΠOW has potentially
more attack strategies as mentioned).
4.2 Proof of Security for ΠOW
We now prove security of ΠOW. In the following, we define N = 2n where n is the user-defined
number of qubits sent per iteration of our protocol. Our proof of security is in three steps.
First, we compute the conditional entropy H(A|E) in the case where B chooses Reflect.
This, of course, is useless for key distillation as B is completely independent of the state in
this case, but it will be used later to argue about the entropy in the actual key-distillation
state (i.e., when B chooses Measure and Resend). Second, we argue that E’s optimal attack
must take on a particular form if A and B use the Z or F basis. Third, and finally, we use
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these results, along with Winter’s continuity bound on conditional entropy [55], to compute
the entropy of A’s register conditioned on E’s quantum memory in the actual key-distillation
state when B chooses Measure and Resend giving us the desired key-rate.
First, we need a channel scenario for the real Πent protocol (which translates, as discussed,
to observations for ΠOW). Keeping in line with other high-dimensional QKD analyses [31, 33],
we consider a symmetric attack modeled as a depolarization channel (which may even be
enforced by users):
EQ(σ) =
(
1− N
N − 1Q
)
σ +
Q
N − 1I. (12)
where σ is any N dimensional quantum state.
We will assume the noise in the forward channel and reverse channel are the same and
parameterized by Q (though our analysis follows even if they are different, though the algebra
complexity increases). In the “reflect” case, we will use a depolarization parameter QF - this
captures the practical case that, for certain fiber channels, reflecting a quantum state back
can “undue” some noise (but in the Measure and Resend case this cannot happen as the
“measurement” breaks any entanglement in the channel) [42, 56].
Let p(x|y) be the probability that a party observes x given the sender sent y (in the Z
or F basis) in either the forward or reverse channel. From this model, we have:
p(x|y) =
{
1−Q if x = y
Q
N−1 otherwise
(13)
In Πent, the probability that AZ1 (i.e., after measuring) is a, for any particular a, is simply
p(a) = 1/N . Furthermore the probability that B measures b is
∑
a p(b|a)p(a) = 1N (1−Q+
(N − 1) Q
N−1) = 1/N . Thus, we set p(b) = 1/N when analyzing Π
OW (E’s choice here must
conform to the observed statistics in the “real” protocol Πent).
Let p(a, b, c) be the probability that, in the case of Measure and Resend, if all parties
measure in the Z basis, A1 measures a, B measures b, and A2 measures c (recall A1 is A’s
first n-qubit register and A2 is her second register). Then, since this is a classical probability
distribution, by the chain rule it holds that:
p(a, b, c) = p(c|b, a) · p(b|a) · p(a). (14)
We will assume that in the Measure and Resend case of Πent, the two channels act in-
dependently and, so, p(c|b, a) = p(c|b). That is, A’s measurement in the return channel,
depends only on what B actually sends. This is a very realistic noise scenario and can even
be enforced by the users - A and B will simply abort if they do not observe this (natural)
behavior. Of course, as discussed, we do not assume the two channels act independently if
B chooses to Reflect (such an assumption would not be natural nor could it be enforced
and so we do not make it here). Under these assumptions, it is not difficult to see that:
p(a, b, c) =
1
N
×

β2 if c = b and b = a
αβ if c 6= b and b = a
αβ if c = b and b 6= a
α2 if c 6= b and b 6= a
(15)
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where:
α =
Q
N − 1 β = 1−Q. (16)
Given these observed channel statistics in Πent we now turn to ΠOW using this same
distribution on measurement events. Ultimately, our goal is to compute a lower-bound on
the key-rate: H(AZ1 |E)µ −H(AZ1 |BZ1 )µ, where µA1B1E is the density operator describing an
iteration of the protocol in the Measure and Resend case.
First Step - Entropy in the Reflect Case: Let ρA1A2BE be the density operator describing
the state of the system (before measurements are made by any party) if B chooses Reflect.
Similarly, let µA1A2BE be the density operator in the case B chooses Measure and Resend.
Since key-bits are only distilled in this Measure and Resend case, to compute the key-rate
of the protocol we will require a bound on the von Neumann entropy H(AZ1 |E)µ. However,
we will actually, first, bound H(AZ1 |E)ρ and later argue that, due to continuity of entropy
[55], the difference in entropy between the two systems, ρ and µ, cannot be “too large.”
Consider the state ρA1A2BE. In this Reflect case, B’s system is completely independent
of all other systems; thus ρA1A2BE ≡ ρA1A2E ⊗ |0〉 〈0|B and so the B portion does not factor
into any entropy equations and may be ignored. Using the entropic uncertainty relation
proven in [50] (see Equation 1), we know:
H(AZ1 |E)ρ ≥ n−H(AF1 |A2)ρ ≥ n−H(AF1 |AF2 )ρ,
where the second inequality follows from the fact that measurements cannot decrease un-
certainty. If we could distill a key from ρ, we would be finished - in fact, the above would
be the case when A1 is attempting to distill a key with herself, “A2” which, of course, is
meaningless from a practical standpoint. However, as we now show, knowing the entropy in
ρ allows us to bound the entropy in µ (which is what we actually want in order to compute
the key-rate of our protocol).
Consider E’s attack operator U against ΠOW. Without loss of generality, we may write
U ’s action on basis states of the form |b, b〉 as follows:
U |b, b〉 ⊗ |χ〉E =
N−1∑
a=0
N−1∑
c=0
|a, c, ea,b,c〉 , (17)
where the |ea,b,c〉 are arbitrary states in E’s ancilla (again, we assume without loss of general-
ity that E’s ancilla is cleared to some initial pure state |χ〉E). Note that we are not assuming
a particular structure to this attack (e.g., we do not assume it consists of the Rw operator
used in the proof of Theorem 1 - instead, it may be arbitrary and if we prove security here,
we will gain security of Πent since it will cover any attack against that protocol).
Consider ρAZ1 E, i.e., the state of the system after A measures the A1 register in the Z
basis and tracing out A2. Tracing the evolution of the state in this case, and recalling that
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p(b) = 1/N due to our (enforceable) symmetry assumption, we find:
ρAZ1 E =
1
N
N−1∑
a=0
|a〉 〈a| ⊗
(
N−1∑
c=0
P
[
N−1∑
b=0
|ea,b,c〉
])
, (18)
where P (z) = zz∗.
On the other hand, tracing the evolution of the protocol in the caseB chooses Measure and Resend,
gives us the following operator:
µAZ1 E =
1
N
N−1∑
a=0
|a〉 〈a| ⊗
(
N−1∑
c=0
N−1∑
b=0
|ea,b,c〉 〈ea,b,c|
)
. (19)
Our goal in the remainder of the security proof is to bound the difference between
H(AZ1 |E)ρ and H(AZ1 |E)µ. To do so, we will use Winter’s continuity bound [55] and in
particular, the case derived for classical-quantum states. This bound states that (rewriting
in terms of our notation of course):
|H(AZ1 |E)ρ −H(AZ1 |E)µ| ≤ ∆ logAZ1 + (1 + ∆)H
(
∆
1 + ∆
)
, (20)
where:
∆ =
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ρAZ1 E − µAZ1 E∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
Of course logAZ1 = n. Thus, our goal is to determine an upper-bound on the trace distance
∆. Note that an upper-bound will only increase the distance between the two entropies
causing the key-rate to drop. Thus by finding an upper-bound, we determine a worst-case
key-rate and the actual key-rate can only be higher.
By elementary properties of trace distance, along with the triangle inequality, we have:
∆ ≤ 1
2N
N−1∑
a,c=0
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣P
(
N−1∑
b=0
|ea,b,c〉
)
−
N−1∑
b=0
|ea,b,c〉 〈ea,b,c|
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆a,c
=
1
2N
∑
a,c
∆a,c. (21)
Second Step - Structure of E’s Attack Operator: Before computing ∆, we argue
now that E’s optimal attack operator has a particular structure to it. As discussed earlier,
let p(a, b, c) denote the probability that measuring A1 results in a; measuring B results in
b; and measuring A2 results in c (where these measurements are performed in the Z basis
in the Measure and Resend case; thus a, b, c ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 1}). It is not difficult to see
that p(a, b, c) = 〈ea,b,c|ea,b,c〉 /N . Indeed, note that the state µAZ1 AZ2 BE (i.e., the case where B
chooses Measure and Resend, but before tracing out AZ2 and B which we did for Equation
19) is found to be:
µAZ1 AZ2 BE =
1
N
∑
a
|a〉 〈a|A1 ⊗
∑
c
|c〉 〈c|A2 ⊗
∑
b
|b〉 〈b|B ⊗ |ea,b,c〉 〈ea,b,c| ,
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from which it is clear that p(a, b, c) = 〈ea,b,c|ea,b,c〉 /N . Since N is known and since p(a, b, c)
is a value that can be observed by the parties running the protocol, this implies 〈ea,b,c|ea,b,c〉
is also an observable quantity.
We now claim that it is to E’s advantage to choose her attack such that for any fixed
a, c, it holds that:
〈ea,b,c|ea,b′,c〉 =
{
N · p(a, b, c) if b = b′
0 if b 6= b′ (22)
Indeed, orthogonal ancilla states cannot increase her uncertainty, thus the only reason to
make these states non orthogonal would be if, by doing so, she could make some other,
potentially “more important” vectors closer to orthogonal (e.g., the non-error cases such as
〈e0,0,0|e1,1,1〉) while still falling within the observed noise statistics. But the inner-product
〈ea,b,c|ea,b′,c〉 does not contribute to the observed noise in any way, assuming basis F is used,
and thus she might as well set them to be orthogonal potentially decreasing her overall
uncertainty (but certainly not increasing it).
Clearly the inner-product 〈ea,b,c|ea,b′,c〉 does not contribute to the Z basis noise when
b 6= b′. We thus consider the F basis noise. Consider the case when B chooses Reflect in
which case the state arriving to A, before measuring, is:
1
2n/2
∑
a,c
|a, c〉 |ga,c〉 , (23)
where |ga,c〉 =
∑
b |ea,b,c〉. Since the above is normalized, it holds that:
1
2n
∑
a,c
〈ga,c|ga,c〉 = 1. (24)
Now, changing basis, we may write |j〉 = ∑x βx,j |Fx〉, where βx,j = 〈Fx|j〉. Clearly, due to
our choice of basis F , it holds that |βx,j|2 = 1/2n. Taking Equation 23 and changing basis
in both the A1 and A2 registers yields:
1
2n/2
∑
x,y
|Fx, Fy〉
(∑
a,c
βx,aβy,c |ga,c〉
)
.
Thus, the probability that A1 measures Fx and A2 measures Fy, for any x, y is:
1
2n
∣∣∣∣∣∑
a,c
βx,aβy,c |ga,c〉
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
2n
∑
a,c
1
22n
〈ga,c|ga,c〉+
∑
(a,c) 6=(a′,c′)
βx,aβ
∗
x,a′βy,cβ
∗
y,c′ 〈ga,c|ga′,c′〉
=
1
22n
+
∑
(a,c) 6=(a′,c′)
βx,aβ
∗
x,a′βy,cβ
∗
y,c′ 〈ga,c|ga′,c′〉 ,
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where for the third equality, we use Equation 24. Note that 〈ga,c|ga′,c′〉, for (a, c) 6= (a′, c′)
has no terms of the form 〈ea,b,c|ea,b′,c〉 (since either a′ or c′ will not equal a or c). Thus the
〈ea,b,c|ea,b′,c〉 inner product cannot affect any observed noise statistic. Therefore there is no
advantage to E in making it non-orthogonal as it cannot benefit her by “hiding” other states
in the noise of the channel (e.g., she cannot use 〈ea,b,c|ea,b′,c〉 to increase the orthogonality of
other vectors to her advantage while still keeping within the observed noise statistics). We
may therefore assume the attack operator U is such that Equation 22 applies. Note that
this proof would not hold if |βi,j|2 6= 1/2n for all i, j.
Thus, for any fixed a and c, we may define an orthonormal basis {|ν(a,c)b 〉}N−1b=0 and write:
|ea,b,c〉 =
√
N · p(a, b, c) |ν(a,c)b 〉 .
Note that we do not assume any relation between these vectors for differing a and c. I.e., we
do not make any assumptions on the value 〈ν(a,c)b |ν(a
′,c′)
b′ 〉 when a 6= a′ or c 6= c′.
Third Step - Continuity Bound Analysis: From the above analysis on the structure of
E’s optimal attack operator, we may write ∆a,c, defined in Equation 21, as:
∆a,c =
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣P
(
N−1∑
b=0
√
N · p(a, b, c) |ν(a,c)b 〉
)
−
N−1∑
b=0
N · p(a, b, c) |ν(a,c)b 〉 〈ν(a,c)b |
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
= N
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣P
(
N−1∑
b=0
√
p(a, b, c) |b〉
)
−
N−1∑
b=0
p(a, b, c) |b〉 〈b|
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ (25)
where the last equality follows from the fact that trace distance is invariant to changes in
basis and, again, we use P (z) = zz∗.
Recall our description of the channel, and in particular the value of p(a, b, c) given in
Equation 15. Note that, if Q = 0, then it is easy to see that ∆a,c = 0 for all a, c and so we
are done. Thus, in the following, we will consider 0 < Q < 1/2. Due to the symmetry in a
depolarization channel as clearly seen in the expression for p(a, b, c) in Equation 15 (again,
this may even be enforced by users), there are two cases to consider, first when c = a and
second when c 6= a. For the first, we have:
∆a,a = N
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣P
(
N−1∑
b=0
√
p(a, b, a) |b〉
)
−
N−1∑
b=0
p(a, b, a) |b〉 〈b|
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
= N
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∑
b6=b′
√
p(a, b, a)p(a, b′, a) |b〉 〈b′|
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ . (26)
Let X be the operator X = N
∑
b 6=b′
√
p(a, b, a) · p(a, b′a) |b〉 〈b′|. Thus ∆a,a = ||X||.
Since it is Hermitian, we may decompose X as:
X =
N−1∑
j=0
λj |vj〉 〈vj| , (27)
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where {|vj〉} are orthogonal eigenvectors and λj are (real) eigenvalues; thus X |vj〉 = λj |vj〉
for all j = 0, · · · , N − 1 and, of course, ||X|| = ∑j |λj|. Consider a particular eigenvector
|v〉 = |vj〉 =
∑
i xi |i〉. Then:
X |v〉 = N
N−1∑
b=0
N−1∑
i=0
i 6=b
xi
√
p(a, b, a) · p(a, i, a)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
yb
|b〉 = N
∑
b
yb |b〉 . (28)
Thus, for λ = λj to be the corresponding eigenvalue, it must hold that Nyb = λxb for all
b = 0, · · · , N − 1. Note that, when b = a, it holds that:
Nya = λxa ⇐⇒ N
N−1∑
i=0
i 6=a
xi
√
p(a, a, a) · p(a, i, a) = λxa ⇐⇒ αβ
∑
i 6=a
xi = λxa. (29)
When b 6= a, then Nyb simplifies to:
N
∑
i 6=b
xi
√
p(a, b, a) · p(a, i, a) = N
xa√p(a, b, a) · p(a, a, a) +∑
i 6=b
i 6=a
xi
√
p(a, b, a) · p(a, i, a)

and thus it must hold that:
αβxa + α
2
∑
i 6=b
i 6=a
xi = λxb. (30)
Now, assume that there exists a k 6= k′ such that xk 6= xk′ and both k and k′ are not
equal to a (we will handle the case when this is not true afterwards). From Equation 30 we
have, using the case when b = k and b = k′ respectively:
αβxa + α
2
∑
i 6=k
i 6=a
xi = λxk
αβxa + α
2
∑
i 6=k′
i 6=a
xi = λxk′ .
Subtracting these two expressions yields:
α2(xk′ − xk) = λ(xk − xk′)
⇒λ = −α2. (31)
We next claim the geometric multiplicity of this eigenvalue is N−2 and, thus, this eigenvalue
appears N − 2 times in Equation 27. Consider the operator X − λI. By choosing a suitable
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basis we may write this in matrix form as:
X − λI =

−λ αβ αβ · · · αβ
αβ −λ α2 · · · α2
αβ α2 −λ · · · α2
...
...
...
. . .
...
αβ α2 α2 · · · −λ
 (32)
Substituting λ = −α2 it is clear that the rank of X − (−α2)I is at most two. Thus the
geometric multiplicity is at least N − 2 (and indeed is exactly N − 2 except when Q = 0 or
Q = 1− 1/N ; but the first case is considered separately as mentioned, and the second case
implies Q > 1/2 which is much larger than our evaluations later and so not considered).
Therefore, exactly N − 2 of the eigenvalues of X are −α2 = − Q2
(N−1)2 .
The remaining two eigenvalues are found when there does not exist k 6= k′ (where k 6= a
and k′ 6= a) such that xk 6= xk′ . In this case we have xk = xk′ = x for all k, k′ not equal to
a. Using Equation 29 we find:
αβ(N − 1)x = λxa =⇒ xa = αβ(N − 1)x
λ
.
Note that the above equation forces x 6= 0 as, otherwise, xa is also 0 and so |v〉 would be the
zero vector and not an eigenvector of Hermitian operator X. Substituting this into Equation
30 (for any b 6= a) we find:
αβ
(
αβ(N − 1)x
λ
)
+ α2(N − 2)x = λx
⇐⇒ λ2 − α2(N − 2)λ− α2β2(N − 1) = 0,
thus leading us to the two remaining eigenvalues, which we denote λX± :
λX± =
1
2
(
α2(N − 2)± α
√
α2(N − 2)2 + 4β2(N − 1)
)
.
Since there was no dependence on a in the above analysis, this leads us to conclude that:
∆a,a = (N − 2) Q
2
(N − 1)2 + |λ
X
+ |+ |λX− |. (33)
We next consider the case when c 6= a and compute ∆a,c. Following the same logic as be-
fore, fix a particular c 6= a and consider the operator Y = N∑b 6=b′ √p(a, b, c) · p(a, b′, c) |b〉 〈b′|
(and so ∆a,c = ||Y ||). Let |v〉 =
∑
i xi |i〉 be an eigenvector of Y such that Y |v〉 = λ |v〉.
Then:
Y |v〉 = N
N−1∑
b=0
N−1∑
i=0
i 6=b
xi
√
p(a, b, c) · p(a, i, c)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
zb
|b〉 = N
∑
b
zb |b〉 .
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To satisfy the equation Y |v〉 = λ |v〉 we require Nzb = λxb for all b = 0, · · · , N − 1. There
are three cases of b to consider here: b = a, b = c and b 6= a, c. For each of these cases we
find:
b = a : Nza = λxa ⇐⇒ αβxc +
∑
i 6=c
i 6=a
xi
√
α3β = λxa (34)
b = c : Nzc = λxc ⇐⇒ αβxa +
∑
i 6=c
i 6=a
xi
√
α3β = λxc (35)
b 6= a, c : Nzb = λxb ⇐⇒
√
α3βxa +
√
α3βxc +
∑
i 6=a
i 6=b
i 6=c
α2xi = λxb. (36)
As with the previous operator X, we break this up into several cases depending on the
eigenvector |v〉. For the first case, assume there exists k 6= k′ with k 6= a, c and k′ 6= a, c such
that xk 6= xk′ . Then, using Equation 36, for b = k and b = k′ and subtracting the resulting
expressions yields:
α2(xk′ − xk) = λ(xk − xk′) =⇒ λ = −α2 (37)
We claim this eigenvalue has geometric multiplicity N − 3. Consider the operator Y − λI
and, as before, by considering a suitable basis, we may write this in matrix form as:
Y − λI =

−λ αβ √α3β √α3β · · · √α3β
αβ −λ √α3β √α3β · · · √α3β√
α3β
√
α3β −λ α2 · · · α2√
α3β
√
α3β α2 −λ · · · α2
...
...
... · · · . . . ...√
α3β
√
α3β α2 α2 · · · −λ

(38)
From this, it is evident that the rank of Y −(−α2)I is three and so the geometric multiplicity
of the eigenvalue −α2 is N − 3 (again, assuming Q 6= 0 and Q 6= 1− 1/N which holds since
0 < Q < 1/2.
Thus, there are 3 more eigenvalues. Next, consider the case if xa 6= xc. In this case,
subtracting Equation 34 and 35 yields:
αβ(xc − xa) = λ(xa − xc) =⇒ λ = −αβ (39)
Finally, consider the case where xa = xc = x1 and xk = xk′ = x2 for every k 6= k′ and
k, k′ 6= a, c. In this case, Equation 36 simplifies to:
2
√
α3βx1 + α
2(N − 3)x2 = λx2 (40)
Note that this implies x2 6= 0 as, otherwise, x1 = 0 and so |v〉 is the zero vector and not an
eigenvector.
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Equation 34 yields:
αβx1 + (N − 2)
√
α3βx2 = λx1
Note that the above equation also implies that λ 6= αβ since if it were, we would have x2 = 0
which, as already discussed, is not true. Thus we may solve:
x1 =
(N − 2)x2
√
α3β
λ− αβ .
Substituting this into Equation 40 yields:
2x2α
3β(N − 2)
λ− αβ + α
2(N − 3)x2 = λx2
⇐⇒ 2α3β(N − 2) + α2(N − 3)(λ− αβ) = λ(λ− αβ). (41)
Solving the above quadratic for λ gives us the two remaining eigenvalues which we denote
λY±. After some algebra, these eigenvalues are found to be:
λY± =
1
2
[
αβ + α2(N − 3)± α
√
(β + α[N − 3])2 + 4αβ(N − 1)
]
(42)
Since the above arguments were for arbitrary a 6= c, this gives us the following:
∆a,c = (N − 3)α2 + αβ + |λY+|+ |λY−|
= (N − 3) Q
2
(N − 1)2 +
Q(1−Q)
N − 1 + |λ
Y
+|+ |λY−|. (43)
Thus, we conclude:
∆ =
1
2N
N−1∑
a,c=0
∆a,c =
1
2N
∑
a
∆a,a +
1
2N
∑
a6=c
∆a,c (44)
=
1
2
(
(N − 2) Q
2
(N − 1)2 + |λ
X
+ |+ |λX− |+ (N − 1)
[
(N − 3) Q
2
(N − 1)2 +
Q(1−Q)
N − 1 + |λ
Y
+|+ |λY−|
])
.
(45)
At first glance, this expression may seem to scale exponentially with n (since N = 2n).
However, note that λ± (for both the X and Y operators) are multiples of α, which, itself, is
a multiple of 1/(N − 1).
Returning to ΠOW, we apply the Winter continuity bound (Equation 20) to attain:
H(AZ1 |E)µ ≥ H(AZ1 |E)ρ −∆ logN − (1 + ∆)H
(
∆
1 + ∆
)
≥ n−H(AF1 |AF2 )ρ −∆ logN − (1 + ∆)H
(
∆
1 + ∆
)
≥ n(1−∆)− (1 + ∆)H
(
∆
1 + ∆
)
−H(AF1 |AF2 )ρ. (46)
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To finish the key-rate computation, we need H(AF1 |AF2 )ρ and H(AZ1 |BZ)µ. The first is
determined through the observed values pFi,j, which we use to denote the probability that
A observes |Fi〉 (in A1) and |Fj〉 (in A2) conditioned on the event B choose Reflect; the
second is determined through the observed values pZi,j which we use to denote the probability
that B observes |j〉 and A observes |i〉 in A1 (we use A1 as this is the register used for
key-distillation) conditioned on the event B choose Measure and Resend. In both cases,
i, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 1}. Clearly these are observable values allowing A and B to compute
these final (classical) entropy expressions. Since we are considering a symmetric attack
modeled by the depolarization channel described in Equation 13, we have pZi,j =
1
N
p(j|i) and
so we compute the joint entropy as:
H(AZ1 B
Z)µ = −
∑
i,j
pZi,j log p
Z
i,j = −
∑
i
1
N
p(i|i) log2 p(i|i)−
∑
i 6=j
1
N
p(j|i) log2 p(j|i)
= (1−Q) log2
1−Q
N
−Q log Q
N(N − 1)
= n+Q log2(N − 1) +H(Q).
It is not difficult to show that H(BZ)µ = n (since the attack is symmetric, B’s probability
of observing any particular value |j〉 is uniform). Thus the conditional entropy is simply:
H(AZ1 |BZ) = Q log2(N − 1) +H(Q).
The case for the F basis is identical, though we use a different noise parameter QF to
parameterize the channel in this case (since the noise may be different in the reflection case
as discussed earlier). In this case we have:
H(AF1 |AF2 ) = QF log2(N − 1) +H(QF ).
Our final key-rate expression, therefore is:
r = H(AZ1 |E)−H(AZ1 |BZ)
≥ n(1−∆)− (1 + ∆)H
(
∆
1 + ∆
)
− (Q+QF ) log2 (2n − 1)−H(Q)−H(QF ). (47)
Note that the above assumed collective attacks. Ordinarily, one may extend such compu-
tations done for the collective attack case to prove security against arbitrary, general, attacks
by using de Finetti style arguments or post-selection techniques [57, 58]. We suspect that
this result holds for our protocol, however we leave a complete proof of that for future work.
4.3 Evaluation
We evaluate our key-rate bound, Equation 47, in two scenarios. First, we assume in the
reflection case, that the reverse channel is independent of the forward and, so, QF = 2Q(1−
Q) shown in Figure 2. In the second dependent case, we assume QF = Q shown in Figure
23
Figure 2: Key-rate of our high-dimensional SQKD protocol when QF = 2Q(1−Q). Here we
plot the case for n = 1, 2, 5, and 50.
Figure 3: Key-rate of our high-dimensional SQKD protocol when QF = Q. Here we plot the
case for n = 1, 2, 5, and 50.
3. We note that, similar to the fully-quantum case [31, 32], as the dimension increases, the
noise tolerance also surpasses the single qubit case. Thus, we prove that this high-dimensional
advantage, known for fully-quantum protocols, also applies to the semi-quantum model. We
also observe numerically that, as n increases, the maximal noise tolerance tends to approach
26% in the independent case and 30% in the dependent case. As mentioned, fully-quantum
high dimensional QKD protocols can tolerate up to 50% error as the dimension increases;
thus, while not as high as the fully-quantum case (which, perhaps, is to be expected), it
is higher than any other semi-quantum protocol to-date. Indeed, the highest known semi-
quantum protocol [26] can tolerate up to 17.8% in the independent case (as opposed to 26%
here) and 26% in the dependent case (as opposed to 30% here). Of course, our Equation 47
is only a lower-bound - future work may improve this. In particular, the use of mismatched
measurements (needed to attain a high noise tolerance in [26]) may greatly benefit our
analysis here. This we leave as an interesting future research direction.
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5 Closing Remarks
In this paper, we designed a new high-dimensional semi-quantum key distribution protocol
and performed an information theoretic security analysis. To conduct this security analysis,
we developed several new techniques for high-dimensional protocols over two-way quantum
channels which may be applicable to other (S)QKD protocols. In particular we showed how
one may reduce a two-way, high dimensional, semi-quantum protocol to a one-way protocol
which is easier to analyze. Thus, we produced new security results of broad application.
We also proved that high-dimensional quantum systems can benefit communication in the
semi-quantum model just as they do in fully-quantum key distribution.
Many interesting future problems remain open. For one thing, it would be interesting
to see if our proof technique can be applied to the high-dimensional quantum-walk based
SQKD protocol introduced in [33]. If so, we would then be able to compare noise tolerance
properties of the two protocols. It would also be interesting to see if we can improve our
bound and technique here. One factor contributing to a potentially lower key-rate bound is
our use of a continuity bound. Other methods may produce more optimistic results.
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